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All of the countries of Western Europe have taken steps to liberalise their electricity 
industries.  Large consumers in every country can choose their electricity supplier, 
and in some countries, this choice has been extended to every consumer.  The 
European Union has decided that from 2007 at the latest, all customers will be able to 
choose their electricity supplier.  A number of large European electricity companies 
have been responding to this changing environment by merging with electricity 
companies in other countries.  This has meant that while some national markets may 
not look unduly concentrated, concentration at the European level has been growing.  
This paper addresses the reasons for this, and asks whether the resulting industry 
structure will be sufficiently competitive to deliver gains from liberalisation.  
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I Introduction 
 
Why are some industries regulated by governments?  Typically, when regulation is 
first adopted, it required enough people (or enough influential people) to believe that 
the results would be better than the results of an unregulated market.  What do we 
mean by better?  Welfare economics suggests that policy should usually aim to 
maximize the sum of consumer and producer welfare, while the public interest theory 
of regulation implies that regulatory decisions are generally taken to further such an 
objective.  In the modern economic literature, Stigler (1971) pointed out that many 
regulatory decisions are actually taken in the interests of the regulated firms, and that 
firms themselves actually press for regulation if they believe that it offers a better 
prospect of “reasonable” profits than the struggle of a competitive market.  He was 
not actually the first to make this point, since Chadwick (1859) gives the example of 
bakers in the suburbs of Paris, who organized a petition asking to be regulated.  Free 
entry had produced the textbook result of minimal profits, and the bakers were willing 
to accept a scheme of price regulation in return for a restriction on the number of 
bakeries permitted to operate – they even volunteered to raise the funds necessary to 
buy out the bakeries that would be closed under the scheme. 
 Why are some formerly regulated industries deregulated?  Again, the standard 
answer is that enough influential people come to believe that deregulation will 
produce better results than continued regulation – either because of genuine changes 
in the industry’s environment or technology, or because of a change in beliefs about 
economic policy.  It is undeniable that some movements towards deregulation have 
been imposed from outside the industries concerned, and a good example concerns 
the deregulation of the electricity industry in England and Wales at the end of the 
1980s.  When Mrs Thatcher won her third election, in 1987, the Conservative 
manifesto contained a pledge to privatise the electricity industry, but no details of how 
it would be done, and she left that up to her Energy Secretary, Cecil Parkinson.  When 
he started talking to the head of the Central Electricity Generating Board, it was clear 
that the latter pictured a monolithic industry, privatised as a whole, with the CEGB at 
its head.  The two previous utility privatisations, of British Telecom and British Gas, 
had involved the sale of incumbent monopolies with only token competition, and the 
electricity industry was reportedly content to follow in this tradition.  The heads of the 
dozen Area Electricity Boards, responsible for distribution, also apparently favoured a 
vertically integrated structure for the privatisation, although they saw generation at the 
bottom, not the top, of the pyramid!  Mr Parkinson, however, wanted to cement his 
reputation with a more imaginative privatisation than before, and listened to outside 
advisors who advocated breaking up the CEGB and introducing real competition into 
the industry (Henney, 1994). 
 Over the next few years, this radical policy of deregulation was adopted, and 
came to be seen as a success.  In Norway, too, the electricity industry was liberalised, 
and the country’s wholesale markets expanded to cover Sweden and then Finland.  
The European Commission took an interest, and started to prepare an EU-wide policy 
of electricity liberalisation.  Directive 96/92/EC, which came into force in February 
1997, required all Member States to open their electricity markets to competition in 
stages, so that consumers taking 33% of their national electricity demand would have 
a choice of supplier by February 2003.  Third parties had to be given access to the 
electricity grid to make this possible, and a measure of unbundling between the grid 
and the newly competitive sectors of the industry was required to create a level 
playing field. 
 3 
 It would be patently false to claim that this deregulation was solely or mainly 
pursued at the behest of the electricity industry.  Some companies may have been in 
favour of deregulation, but a number of EU governments sought to delay or water 
down the process, and governmental reluctance was often associated with an exiting 
industry structure that was incompatible with the proposals for liberalisation.  The 
most obvious example is that of France, which pressed for the Directive to include a 
“Single Buyer” model, in which a nation-wide organisation would buy power from 
generators and then make it available for retailers, alongside the Third Party Access 
models intended to allow normal wholesale transactions between generators and 
retailers.  France had (and has) a dominant, state-owned, electricity company, 
Electricité de France, and the Single Buyer model would probably have preserved this 
dominance, at least if adopted in the form which the French government had argued 
for.  In practice, the European Commission amended the proposal until it would have 
had the same effects as regulated Third Party Access, and the French duly adopted 
regulated Third Party Access when the Directive was eventually incorporated into 
French law. 
While we should not claim that electricity deregulation in Europe was adopted 
at the request of the electricity industry, we should not forget all the lessons of the 
interest group theory of regulation, either.  We can be confident that the major firms 
in the electricity industry, once they realised that deregulation was definitely coming, 
will have been taking actions to influence its form, and to prepare for its effects.  In 
Germany, for example, the entire electricity market was rapidly opened to 
competition, but the Germans adopted a system of negotiated, rather than regulated, 
Third Party Access.  Since the networks will remain natural monopolies for the 
foreseeable future, the choice of negotiated Third Party Access gave the companies an 
opportunity to shift the industry’s profits into a segment that should remain immune 
from competition. 
The other lesson is that firms will always react to their environment, and if 
they cannot influence their market’s rules, they may try to influence its structure.  
Over the last few years, Europe has seen an unprecedented wave of cross-border 
mergers in electricity, as companies have prepared for electricity deregulation.  Over 
the last five years, the share of the top five firms in the EU has risen from 49 to 58%. 
This paper looks at that process, and its implications.  The next section sets out 
the requirements for successful deregulation in the electricity industry, and analyses 
the problems that can be caused by market power.  Section III discusses the trends in 
concentration and integration in the electricity industry in England and Wales, one of 
the first to be deregulated.  Section IV looks at the increasing trend towards horizontal 
integration in Europe, and asks whether the trends have gone so far as to endanger the 
goals of the deregulation.  Section V concludes.  
 
 
II. Electricity deregulation and its requirements 
 
We traditionally identify three segments in the electricity industry – generation, (high-
voltage) transmission, and (low-voltage) distribution, which included the retailing 
activity of actually dealing with customers.  When the competitive approach began to 
spread, a fourth segment was added, as retailing, or supply, was separated from 
distribution.  Transmission and distribution are natural monopolies, and the direct 
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impact of deregulation on these segments has been limited.1  Generation and supply, 
however, are potentially competitive activities, and have been opened up. 
 Competition in generation requires that the new generators can have access to 
the transmission system, and can find a market for their power.  This might be a 
formal wholesale market, or they might simply sell through bilateral contracts.  Since 
the generator will almost never produce exactly the amount of power required by its 
customers, however, the transmission system operator must be ready to absorb a 
surplus or make up a deficit.  If the system operator is also the owner of a competing 
generating company, however, it is likely to have an incentive to discriminate against 
the entrants.  In its simplest form, this would just involve charging a high price to 
access the grid, which would not affect the overall profitability of generation and 
transmission combined, but might make the entrant generator unprofitable.  The 
obvious remedy for this is to regulate transmission charges, and to ensure that the 
transmission segment is at least functionally separate from the rest of the organisation, 
with separate accounts, so that its profitability can be audited. 
Such functional separation may not be enough for truly fair competition, 
however.  The system operator might always be tempted to favour its own generators 
over rivals, and it would often be impossible to tell whether this had in fact happened. 
Running a transmission system is a complex process involving a lot of judgment, and 
there are few auditable rules that say exactly when it becomes unacceptably risky to 
allow all generators to continue with their planned output decisions.  The only way to 
ensure that the transmission operator is not tempted to favour its own generators is to 
prohibit it from owning any, introducing legal separation.  In England and Wales, the 
National Grid Company owns and operates the transmission network, and does not 
own any generation, whereas in the US, several Independent System Operators have 
been set up to control transmission assets owned by other, frequently integrated, 
firms. 
Competition in supply is less vulnerable to “technical” discrimination, since 
distribution networks are generally operated as a passive conduit from the 
transmission system to the final customer.  While large customers may have 
connections to the grid that can be individually switched, if small customers are 
allowed to choose their supplier, they will inevitably receive the same standard of 
distribution service as others in their neighbourhood.  The main obstacle to having 
competition to supply small consumers is the difficulty of keeping track of their 
purchases, especially if the cost of electricity varies significantly over the course of 
the day.  The usual answer is to set up a system of profiling, so that the cost of the 
power taken by any one consumer is assumed equal to the average cost of power 
taken by consumers of that class.  It is not really necessary to separate distribution 
from supply (although some English companies did so voluntarily, and the British 
government is now compelling functional separation) as long as all suppliers, 
including the incumbent, have to pay the same distribution charges.  Once again, these 
should not be excessive, and regulation is the usual way of ensuring this.  
Provided that these technical requirements are met, competition in supply to 
large customers is relatively easy to establish.  Most large electricity consumers are 
spending what they consider to be significant amounts of money on power, and so 
they are willing to shop around for the best deal, or to employ a specialist agent to do 
                                                          
1 They have had to adjust their way of working to interact with the deregulated segments, of course, 
and a few countries have introduced “merchant transmission”, allowing others to build new lines that 
fill gaps in the incumbent’s network, but transmission and distribution do not generally face direct 
competition as a result of deregulation. 
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so on their behalf.  Incumbent suppliers may start with a market share of 100%, but 
this can rapidly fall, even if they adopt a strategy of remaining competitive on price 
with their rivals.  Some supply companies may adopt the broader strategy of 
providing energy services, including advice on energy efficiency measures (or even 
their installation) as a way of adding value.  Large customers are generally well-
informed, and since they can be safely left to protect themselves against exploitation 
by shopping around, it is feasible to deregulated the prices that they have to pay, 
either when, or soon after, the market is opened. 
Competition to supply small customers is much harder to establish.  The 
amounts of money involved per customer are far smaller, reducing the incentive to 
entrants to come in to the industry.  Most customers have little interest in their 
electricity bills, and so suppliers must follow more active marketing strategies if they 
are to win market share.  Even so, few customers are likely to switch away from the 
incumbent unless quite large savings are on offer.  That either implies that the entrant 
must have much lower costs than the incumbent, or that the incumbent is allowed to 
charge a price well above its costs.  In England and Wales, a legacy of expensive 
power purchase contracts did mean that the average costs of the incumbent suppliers 
were higher than the marginal cost of selling to new customers (even though the 
companies doing that selling were mostly incumbents in other areas), but the regulator 
did not force the incumbents’ prices to fall as fast as their costs did.  This created 
enough headroom for the competing suppliers to attract about one-third of all 
electricity consumers, but has not protected the two-thirds who did not switch away 
from the incumbent. Price regulation has now been lifted from electricity supply 
(though not the transmission and distribution charges) in Great Britain, and there are 
concerns that further falls in wholesale prices have not been passed on to small 
consumers.  Price dispersion is quite high in Norway, and switching low, while few 
consumers in Germany have changed their supplier.  Overall, supply competition has 
not yet proved itself an effective way of limiting prices to small consumers.  
Generation represents a much higher proportion of the industry’s costs than 
supply, and it is here that we might expect the greatest potential for efficiency gains.  
Both sides of the market contain large, well-informed, players with a lot to gain from 
efficient decision-making.  The transactions costs involved in setting up a wholesale 
electricity market need not be excessive in relation to the potential benefits.  Those 
benefits should come from more efficient operation, as the profit motive encourages 
firms to find better ways of running themselves, and from better investment decisions.  
Of the two, the investment decision has to potential both for greater savings and for 
greater losses.  Building the wrong sort of power plant, or the wrong amount of 
capacity, is expensive, and the hope of deregulation is that companies will be given 
the right financial incentives to make the right decisions.  However, if the market for 
power plant investment is characterised by herd-like behaviour and cycles of 
alternately excessive and inadequate investment, then the wrong decisions may be 
made. 
 The greatest obstacle to benefits from competition in generation is market 
power.  In most markets, the possibility of storage, substitution to alternative 
products, and the threat of entry can give some protection to consumers, even if there 
may be few sellers in the short term. Electricity cannot be stored, it has no substitute 
in many of its uses, and it is produced from capital-intensive power stations with long 
planning and construction times.  The normal protections therefore fail to apply.  At 
peak times, the margin of spare capacity on most electric systems will generally be 
less than the size of the largest generating company.  This means that the largest 
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company will be “pivotal” at those times, for demand cannot be met without using 
some of its plants.  It can ask any legal price that it wishes for the output from those 
plants, and the grid operator will be forced to pay that price or cut off some 
consumers. 
 There are some limits to this market power, of course.  The requirement that 
the price is legal can be an important one, since some US markets have formal bid 
caps, limiting the amount that any station can bid, while European Law prohibits the 
abuse of a dominant position.  Note that if the margin of spare capacity is low enough, 
however, a number of quite small generators can each be pivotal, without reaching the 
market shares that European Law associates with dominance.  The British regulator 
attempted to fill this gap by introducing a market abuse licence condition2 that would 
have prohibited the abuse of a position of substantial market power, and would have 
applied to companies with a market share of only eight per cent – well below the EU’s 
threshold.  If the generators have sold much of their power under contract at fixed 
prices, they have much less incentive to raise the spot price that they receive for the 
remainder (Newbery, 1998; Green, 1999), although higher spot prices can of course 
influence the price that they receive for their next set of contracts.  In the medium 
term, entry is a genuine threat, and generators need to consider whether an era of high 
prices will encourage so much entry that they destroy their long-term profitability.   
 One obstacle to entry is vertical integration, however.  Consider a supplier that 
is integrated backwards into generation, but also trades in the wholesale market.  In a 
static model, a large vertically integrated firm will have incentives to manipulate the 
wholesale price, that depend on whether it is a net buyer or net seller.  The net seller 
will want to raise the wholesale price, bidding above cost with its power stations, 
while the net buyer will want to reduce the price, possibly selling below cost from its 
own stations, since this will have a greater impact on the firm’s overall purchase costs 
than on the profits from its stations.  However, to the extent that the unintegrated 
generator or supplier would have a greater incentive to manipulate prices (since its net 
sales or purchases would equal its gross trades), there can be a short-term gain to 
integration.  The real costs lie in the long term.  If the integrated firm prefers self-
dealing to trading on an open market, liquidity in the open market will suffer.  This 
will penalise non-integrated competitors in the short term, and make entry harder in 
the long term.  Successful entry into generation requires either a long-term power 
purchase agreement, together with associated contracts which allow the generator to 
lock in all the main financial parameters (fuel cost, selling price, financing cost) and 
enter at low risk with project finance, or a liquid market in which a “merchant 
generator” can feel confident of selling its power at a reasonable price.  If there are 
few non-integrated buyers willing to sign a long-term power purchase agreement, and 
the spot market is also illiquid (and potentially volatile) it is unlikely that many 
investors will want to accept the risk of building a new power station, with its large 
sunk costs.  There will still be some price at which entry supported by a well-financed 
parent company becomes viable, but it is likely to be well above the levels expected in 
a more competitive market. 
                                                          
2 All large UK generators must have a licence, which sets out their legal obligations (such as obeying 
the industry’s operational codes, and providing information to the regulator).  The licences can also 
contain measures to affect their conduct, such as the price control clauses contained in the licences of 
distribution and transmission companies.  The market abuse licence condition was accepted by six of 
the eight generators that the regulator wished it to cover, but the remaining two appealed against its 
insertion, and the Competition Commission, the UK’s competition court, ruled that the condition was 
not necessary in their cases.  The regulator then withdrew it from the other six licences.  
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In an interconnected market, entry can come from foreign generators as well 
as from newly built plants, and can therefore take place rather more quickly, and 
without the risks of building new plant.  The main constraints here are from the nature 
of the transmission system, since most of the grids in Europe were built to meet 
national needs, with rather weak connections to surrounding countries, limiting the 
amount of power that can be traded internationally.  The physics of electricity 
transmission also implies that companies may be able to take actions – often counter-
intuitive ones – that increase the impact of these constraints and enhance their market 
power.3  However, the transmission systems are being strengthened (which can be as 
much a case of better operating procedures to ensure that the most is made of the 
available capacity, as of building new lines) and international trade in Europe is 
currently increasing. 
The other obstacle to competition from abroad, however, is a behavioural one.  
The theory of multi-market contact (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990) implies that when 
companies meet in several markets, this can increase the probability of successful 
collusion, compared to a situation in which the firms only meet in one place.  The key 
condition is that that the markets must not be identical from the point of view of the 
firms – if they were, we could simply “scale up” the analysis of a single market.  If 
the markets differ in ways that affect the profitability of collusion, however, then 
there can be important effects.  Firms will be able to collude if the short-term gain 
from expanding output is less than the cost of a subsequent price war.  In some 
markets, this condition will be easily met and collusion is sustainable, while other 
markets would be unable to sustain collusion, in isolation.  If the two markets are 
considered together, however, then the cost of a price war in both markets 
simultaneously could outweigh the short-term gains from expanding output.  The 
“spare” market power from the market where collusion is easily sustainable is 
effectively transferred to the second market.  Fernandez and Marin (1998) show that 
the amount of spare market power can be increased if the price which firms attempt to 
sustain in the “easily collusive” market is reduced, and this will raise the price that 
can be sustained in the other market by more than enough to raise profits overall. 
To sum up, while liberalisation in the electricity industry has the potential to 
create significant efficiency gains, and to pass them on to consumers, we should be 
worried about the potential for market power in generation.  This potential will be 
greatest where companies are large relative to the amount of spare capacity.  Even 
where the amount of spare capacity seems sufficient, tacitly collusive outcomes are a 
real possibility, and made more likely if the companies involved meet in a number of 
separate markets.  In the next sections, we will see that many European electricity 
companies have been engaged in mergers that will have precisely that effect.  
 
 
III. Vertical Integration in England and Wales  
 
Traditionally, electricity companies in Europe were regional or national.  Some were 
vertically integrated, but there were many distribution-only utilities (often at the 
municipal level), so that most of the larger firms were net generators.  These net 
generators sold power to other utilities under contract or tariff arrangements, rather 
                                                          
3 Gilbert, Neuhoff and Newbery (2002), for example, show that a company might wish to exploit 
market power by increasing its output, the opposite of what we would normally take to be anti-
competitive behaviour, if this creates congestion on a link and hence separates two markets, allowing 
the company to benefit from higher prices in (at least) one of them. 
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than through markets.  Where power flowed across national boundaries, it was 
frequently on a “split-savings” basis, priced at the average of the calculated marginal 
cost of the two systems involved.  There was little reason for firms to integrate across 
borders, or increase the integration between generation and supply. 
This has changed since the start of electricity market liberalisation.  The first 
country in Europe to liberalise was England and Wales, in 1990.  Generation had long 
been separated from distribution and supply, and the restructuring largely continued 
this separation, while allowing limited integration by both the major generators and 
the Regional Electricity Companies.  The RECs were also granted ownership of the 
National Grid Company, in part because the government’s financial advisors believed 
that a transmission-only electricity company would be too exotic to float on the stock 
market, with a holding company structure designed to stop the RECs influencing its 
decisions.  As soon as NGC had a reasonable track record, and the RECs wanted to 
de-merge it, the government and the regulator were happy for them to do so. 
Competition in supply was opened up in stages, and at first the major generators were 
allowed jointly to sell directly to 15% of the demand in each RECs’ area.  This 
represented half of the competitive market, at the national level, although some RECs 
had a much larger share of eligible customers.  The major generators were soon 
recognised to be offering the lowest prices, and customers who were unable to obtain 
these prices because the generators had reached their direct sales limits complained.  
The limits were twice increased, and abolished in 1992.  Figure 1 shows the industry’s 
structure in 1990, with a very concentrated generation sector, and a large number of 
regional suppliers.  While supply appears fragmented, within each area, the local REC 
had a market share of around four-fifths, since 70% of the market was still a franchise 
monopoly. 
The RECs were allowed to integrate into generation, but their ownership 
stakes were limited to between 400 MW and 1,000 MW, set at approximately 15% of 
the maximum demand in each REC’s area.  A REC which reached its limit with plant 
running at base load might generate enough power for a quarter of the sales in its area, 
or roughly half the power sold to small consumers.  The price controls that applied 
between 1990 and 1998 allowed the REC to pass on the cost of buying power from its 
own plant to its small consumers.  This was subject to an “economic purchasing” 
condition that required the RECs to demonstrate that they were buying at “the best 
effective price reasonably obtainable having regard to the sources available”, but the 
RECs were able to cite the unattractive prices with which the major generators had 
opened their negotiations for future sales, and justify prices that, with hindsight, look 
expensive. 
One REC took essentially no interest in generation; most took stakes in one or 
two new power stations, and Eastern, the largest, built two stations and took a stake in 
a third, using 83% of its limit by 1995 (Offer, 1994).  By that time, the regulator had 
persuaded the two major generators to divest 6 GW of plant in order to reduce their 
market power and avoid a reference to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
(which might have resulted in a worse fate).  Eastern was one of a number of 
interested bidders, but the own-generation limit would have prohibited it from 
acquiring the plant.  The regulator consulted on relaxing the limit, and eventually 
agreed that a REC could own additional stations, provided that it did not sell the 
power from those stations to small customers in its own area, those at most risk of 
exploitation.  Effectively, the hope was that as more RECs chose to exceed the own-
generation limits, they would all be forced to buy power for their small customers on 
the open market, and would be unable to charge an excessive price for sales from their 
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own stations, since this would have to be passed on to large customers willing and 
able to seek out the lowest prices.  This should have eliminated the worst effects of 
vertical integration, although entry by non-integrated firms could still have been made 
harder if the vertically-integrated firms took too great a share of the market.4  Eastern 
was duly allowed to lease the 6 GW of plant from National Power and PowerGen. 
At the same time that Eastern was trying to integrate backwards, National 
Power and PowerGen both bid to acquire RECs, in September 1995.  The bids were 
referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, which found that they might be 
expected to act against the public interest if they proceeded without safeguards 
(MMC, 1996a, b).  Most members of the group which produced the report believed 
that the bids could go ahead subject to safeguards such as restrictions on the transfer 
of information about wholesale contracts, and the divestiture of the RECs’ stakes in 
independent power stations.  One member, however, issued a minority report, arguing 
that competition in the industry was still under-developed, and allowing vertical 
integration on this scale would impede entry to a dangerous extent.  The final decision 
rested with a government minister,5 and he blocked the mergers.  By 1998, therefore, 
generation in England and Wales was still fairly concentrated, but there was little 
vertical integration, as shown in figure 2. 
That changed in the following few years.  The government determined to 
increase competition in generation with further plant divestitures, and the major 
generators were able to get permission to buy a REC and a REC’s supply business in 
return.  The divested stations were sold to US utilities without significant supply 
interests in the UK, but the generators went on to sell further stations, and some of 
these were sold to UK-based suppliers.  Electricité de France had bought London 
Electricity in 1998, and bought the 2 GW Cottam power station from PowerGen in 
2000.  EdF had also acquired the SWEB supply business, in the South West of 
England, and supplied power over the cross-channel interconnector.  Scottish Power, 
which was vertically integrated in its home market, had bought an English REC, 
Manweb, in 1995, and bought the Rye House gas-fired power station from PowerGen.  
National Power bought Yorkshire Electricity, and then swapped its distribution 
business for Northern Electric’s supply business.  By this time, the largest generation 
company was British Energy, the privatised nuclear generator, which had attempted to 
increase its vertical integration by buying the Swalec supply business in South Wales, 
but had sold it on to Scottish and Southern Energy (another combination of a REC 
and an integrated Scottish company) once it was apparent that the company would be 
unable to acquire the economies of scale believed necessary to compete in supply.   
This desire for economies of scale meant that by the beginning of 2002 there 
were just seven large suppliers in the domestic market: Innogy (the UK arm demerged 
from National Power), PowerGen, TXU (Eastern had taken on its US parent’s name), 
London Electricity, Scottish Power, Scottish & Southern Energy and Centrica (the 
former British Gas).  The one remaining independent REC, Seeboard, was to be 
bought later in the year by London.  Generation was now more fragmented than 
supply, and some of the larger generators were actually net buyers. 
                                                          
4 In practice, the restriction on electricity purchase would eventually prove unenforceable, as the 
companies were not required to keep separate contract portfolios for large and small customers within 
their own areas, and perhaps unnecessary, as competition grew, and so Ofgem have proposed that it 
should be dropped (Ofgem, 2002b).  
5 If the Monopolies and Mergers Commission reports that a merger may be expected to act against the 
public interest, the final decision on whether or not to allow it, and what conditions to impose, is taken 
by the Cabinet Minister for Trade and Industry, who at the time had adopted the Victorian title of 
President of the Board of Trade. 
 10 
A combination of fragmented generation, excess capacity, vertical integration 
and a new set of trading rules produced much lower wholesale prices from late 2000 
onwards, and several generators faced severe financial problems.  British Energy has 
had to be bailed out by the government, and TXU Europe had to be placed in 
administration – although a net supplier in physical terms, its contractual 
commitments left it exposed to the fall in wholesale prices.  TXU’s power stations 
and supply business were bought by PowerGen in October 2002, further increasing 
concentration in supply.  E.On of Germany had successfully bid for PowerGen in 
October 2001, while Innogy was acquired by RWE in May 2002.   
In mid-2003, Great Britain thus has six large electricity suppliers, all vertically 
integrated and half of them foreign-owned, with little prospect of new entry to the 
market to sell to domestic consumers, given the costs of setting up a large-scale 
supply business.  The industrial and commercial market is potentially more 
contestable, but this depends on access to generation, and many of the remaining 
independent generators are suffering financial problems that could lead to their take 
over by the integrated groups. 
Could six groups be enough for effective competition?  There have been 
complaints that reductions in wholesale prices have not been passed on to domestic 
consumers (e.g. Energywatch, 2002), although the regulator has calculated that the 
reductions in prices between 1998 and 2002 are close to those in overall costs 
(Ofgem, 2002a).  It is certainly the case that consumers can save more than 10% of 
the average bill by switching supplier, but the incumbents need prices that exceed 
their marginal costs if they are to recover their fixed costs, and entrants might be 
willing to sell at close to marginal cost.  The open question is whether future cost 
reductions would be passed on to consumers, or whether the incumbents would be 
willing to accept a slightly higher loss of market share in order to preserve their 
margins.   
 
 
IV. Horizontal Integration in Europe 
 
The pattern of electricity company mergers on the continent of Europe has been rather 
different from that in England and Wales, reflecting a different starting point.  Many 
companies already had a high degree of vertical integration, and some had large 
shares of their national markets.  For the most part, national regulators were 
concerned to avoid further concentration within a national market, although there 
have been some marked exceptions.  For example, while Endesa, Spain’s largest 
electricity firm, was being privatised, the Spanish government it to raise its market 
share of generation from 37% to 50% by taking over two smaller firms, Sevillana and 
Fecsa (Regibeau, 1999).  Some governments have taken steps to break up their larger 
firms, however, such as the Italian government’s requirement that ENEL should sell 
15 GW, or 25% of its capacity, as part of the liberalisation process. 
 With limited prospects for growth in their national markets, Europe’s larger 
electricity companies have mostly sought to acquire firms in other markets.  
Electricité de France has been particularly noticeable in this regard, perhaps because it 
is already Europe’s largest electricity company, and, as a state-owned company, is 
itself immune from take-over.  EdF has acquired the Regional Electricity Company 
London Electricity in the UK, and through it, a second REC (Seeboard), the supply 
business of a third (SWEB), and a number of power stations.  In Germany, EdF took a 
34.5% stake in EnBW, then the third-largest utility in the country, which has also 
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been involved in a series of mergers.  In return, the European Commission forced EdF 
to sell 6 GW of “virtual” capacity, to increase the amount of competition within the 
French electricity market.  In Sweden, EdF took a 36% stake in Graninge, and agreed 
to co-ordinate its voting with the founder’s family, gaining control of the country’s 
fourth largest electricity company (albeit one with a market share of only 4%).  In 
Italy, EdF is a member of the Italenergia consortium, owner of Edison, the country’s 
second-largest electricity company.  In Austria, EdF acquired joint control, with the 
regional government, of Estag, a holding company owning a regional power 
company, and gas and heat distribution companies.  This list, drawn from Codognet et 
al (2002), is deliberately not exhaustive, and the original source is strongly 
recommended for further information.  Figure 4 shows the effect of these mergers, 
and the others discussed below, on market shares within Europe. 
 RWE, Germany’s largest electricity company, has taken over Innogy, which 
inherited almost all the UK-based assets of National Power when that company split 
itself in two in 2000.  In Austria, RWE has taken a controlling minority stake in the 
regional utility Kelag, while in Portugal, it is now the 100% owner of the Tapada 
power plant.  It has acquired 90% of the shares in the Dutch electricity and gas 
supplier Obragas, and taken a 25% stake in the small Italian generator Elettra. 
 Vattenfall is Sweden’s largest electric utility, with a 40% market share, and 
has been actively buying other companies in the Nordic market, including Oslo 
Energi, the distributor for Norway’s capital.  In Germany, Vattenfall has acquired 
HEW and VEAG, the large utilities for Hamburg and for much of the former East 
Germany, and Bewag, the distribution company for Berlin.  These have been 
combined into a single group, Vattenfall Europe, which is now the third-largest 
electricity company in Germany. 
 Endesa of Spain has acquired a 30% stake in SNET, a generator with 2.5% of 
the French market, and holds 51% of the shares in the consortium which owns 
Elettrogen, one of the companies divested by Enel, with 7% of Italian generation.  
Endesa also attempted to buy two Dutch distribution utilities, but failed to win 
regulatory approval by the deadline that it had set, and the deals lapsed. 
 A 1999 merger between VEBA, owner of Bayernwerk, and VEAG, owner of 
PreussenElektra, created E.On, Germany’s second largest electric utility.  E.On has 
since been involved in mergers in Sweden, buying 60% of Sydkraft, the second 
largest power group; in The Netherlands, buying EZH, the smallest of the country’s 
four generators, with a 14% market share; and in the UK, buying PowerGen, now a 
large integrated utility.  In July 2001, E.On started building a stake in Ruhrgas, 
Germany’s largest gas utility, which was responsible for 60% of the long distance gas 
transmission in the country, and soon acquired control.  The Federal Cartel Office 
blocked the take-over in January 2002, but this was over-ruled by the Federal 
government in July.  A number of other companies initiated court action against the 
take-over and obtained an injunction, but withdrew their objections in February 2003, 
apparently in return for a programme of disposals by E.On and Ruhrgas, which seem 
likely to benefit the objectors. 
 This merger does raise serious concerns over competition, because gas is the 
fuel of choice for entrants into most markets.  If the heart of Europe’s gas grid is 
controlled by an electricity company, it will have an obvious incentive to over-charge 
or obstruct rival generators.  The best remedy for these concerns is structural 
separation – if the grids are owned by companies with an incentive to discriminate 
between users, then very careful and transparent regulation is required.  E.On and 
Ruhrgas had accepted a government request to divest the gas network to a legally 
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separate company by 2004, although “network access conditions in Germany … have 
not yet reached the appropriate standards for transparency or non-discriminatory third 
party access” (McCarthy, 2003).  Even so, the combined company’s market share in 
electricity and in gas trading raises serious concerns over market power.  It is 
interesting to speculate whether the European Commission would also have allowed 
the merger to proceed.  Under the EU merger regulation, the merger was considered 
by the German government, since both companies had two-thirds of their turnover in 
that country at the time that the merger was notified.  If E.On’s merger with 
PowerGen had been completed at that time, less than two-thirds of its turnover would 
have been within Germany, and the European Commission would have been 
responsible for considering the merger, instead.  The Commission might have taken a 
more robust line than the German government. 
 Other companies, not mentioned here, have also been involved in cross-border 
mergers.  The pattern is clear – Europe’s larger electricity companies have been 
growing larger, acquiring footholds in new markets.  These footholds could be used to 
compete aggressively across Europe, but the relatively limited number of really large 
companies, and the theory of multi-market contact, suggest a more worrying 
alternative, that the European electricity industry would become dominated by a few 
firms with little incentive to compete. 
 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
One of the basic principles of economics is that people and companies respond to 
incentives.  In other words, they respond to their economic environment, and when 
that environment changes, we can expect them to change their behaviour.  In general, 
companies facing competition can expect greater profits, and an easier life, the larger 
they are in relation to their industry.  If a formerly regulated industry is liberalised, the 
increase in competition raises the rewards to size.  Mergers are generally the easiest 
way to make a company larger, especially if some regional and municipal 
governments are finding it newly politically acceptable to sell the utilities that they 
have long owned. 
This paper has shown how the electricity industry of England and Wales, 
initially restructured with almost no vertical integration, has become increasingly 
vertically integrated.  Many European electricity companies were already vertically 
integrated at the time when restructuring started, and national regulators prevented 
them from growing in their home markets.  Their reaction to the liberalisation has 
frequently been to expand across national borders.  As a result, the European 
electricity industry is becoming increasingly concentrated. 
It is probably better to describe it as an industry than as a “market” – the links 
between national markets are currently too weak, in most cases, for us to talk of a 
European market.  In time, transmission links may be strengthened, and the trading 
infrastructure created, to allow a more European market.  The more integrated the 
market becomes, the less we need to worry about concentration within any one 
country, provided that concentration at the European level remains low.  But at 
present, the markets are mostly national, albeit with an increasing amount of 
international power flows.  If European concentration continues to increase, and the 
same few companies are operating in each of the national markets, then they may lose 
the incentive to compete too actively with each other. 
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Large consumers need that active competition to benefit from having access to 
the electricity market.  They do have the incentive and the ability to shop around, and 
so competition can be a more effective protection than regulation.  Some small 
consumers also shop around, and obtain lower prices in a competitive market, but 
many others have not done so, and have not been well protected by the decision to 
liberalise their markets.  These consumers would almost certainly have been better off 
if market opening, with all its transactions costs, had been replaced by a tougher 
system of price regulation to pass through the purchase cost savings from a 
competitive wholesale market.  If the wholesale market is characterised by tacit 
collusion, however, there may be few savings to pass on.  
At the moment, Europe probably does have enough separate electricity 
companies to provide genuine competition in most of its national markets.  However, 
the larger companies have a significant economic incentive to change that, and are 
likely to seek further mergers.  If European electricity liberalisation is to work in 
favour of consumers rather than producers, the competition authorities will need to be 
vigilant.  
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